Talk:Non-materialist neuroscience

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This looks fun. BTW, i was just going over some of the Grier et al crap. I pulled up their "study" in Neuroendo. Letters, but didn't find any response/critique in the same journal yet (didn't look hard) but the methodology is horrible.--PalMD-Goatspeed! 16:58, 13 July 2007 (CDT)

Have you gotten to the part where they formed their own IRB made up of their relatives and friends to approve the ethics of their research? Wonderful people... tmtoulouse irritate 17:01, 13 July 2007 (CDT)
Makes me wish for a Hell to damn them to. I can't even get people to fill out a survey without closer scrutiny. BTW...never mind, ill email you--PalMD-Goatspeed! 17:04, 13 July 2007 (CDT)

I hope you don't mind if i spend a little while on this editing and such.69.216.143.219 20:39, 14 July 2007 (CDT)

I am trying to decide how I feel about this. On one hand, I want to think they are like children going "no huh mine is better than your 'science'". On the other hand, I feel like they are challenging science to a penis measuring contest while assuring us that "it gets bigger".because I like linksthe_anti-drug(elk murder) 18:20, 13 July 2007 (CDT)

Should we add this to the lists of pseudosciences? ThunderkatzHo! 15:16, 16 July 2007 (CDT)

Contents

[edit] Link collection for research

I am sticking links here for me to remember, and for anyone else to take a look at who wants to explore this issue and help develop the article. Some of it maybe behind journals that require a subscription. If someone does not have access to a paper and wants it just alert me on here, e-mail or my talk page and I can get you an "educational" copy:

[edit] Michael Egnor

[edit] Mario Beauregard's stuff

[edit] Interesting works on materialist evidence of thought

tmtoulouse irritate 13:12, 14 July 2007 (CDT)

On the general topic of "quantum mind" nonsense, good starting points are A. Litt et al., "Is the Brain a Quantum Computer?" Cognitive Science (2006) and Scott Aaronson's Quantum Computing Since Democritus. Oh, and I wrote about Egnor here and here, among other places. (The comments to the latter post contain some irritating trolling, so be forewarned.) Feel free to adapt what you find helpful. Blake Stacey 15:28, 16 July 2007 (CDT)

Awesome stuff Blake thank you, a lot of that will be useful particularly some of the historical background stuff which is not my strong suit but should be put in for context. 24.141.169.255 15:45, 16 July 2007 (CDT)

[edit] Too technical? Doesn't make sense?

I am trying to walk a fine line between trying to give a feel for just how great and detailed our knowledge is, while making it understandable and readable....how am I doing with that? I notice a comment that some of the imaging correlate stuff was confusing, can you expand on that? tmtoulouse irritate 15:27, 18 July 2007 (CDT)

I just meant that "For example, activation of the medial prefrontal cortex is associated with memories and judgments involve self-references and not when the same thoughts are processed about other people." is a poorly written sentence. I can't fix it because I'm not exactly sure what you're trying to say. But I think you're doing a good job of being both knowledged and readable. ThunderkatzHo! 15:35, 18 July 2007 (CDT)
I understood it, but it should say "that involve" not "involve". And it needs a comma after "self references" so the reader can catch their breath. Tmt sometimes works too fast, is all. humanbe in 23:56, 30 August 2007 (CDT)
The section "Drug manipulation, surgery, and injury" Has this third sentence: "While powerfully suggest direct manipulation of brain structures is needed to demonstrate causation." While I can make a stab at making it make more sense, I can't do so while keeping the rest of the paragraph coherent. Any ideas?--Bob_M (talk) 12:59, 31 August 2007 (CDT)

[edit] I guess I should finish this now

Hopefully I will be motivated now to finish this up. tmtoulouse irritate 23:46, 29 August 2007 (CDT)

[edit] Quantum mind

Does anyone want to touch his quantum mind stuff? I can do it but if we have some quantum physics geeks who want to tackle it, it might be better? tmtoulouse irritate 22:00, 30 August 2007 (CDT)

Um, have we bought "math" yet? It might be helpful. And, while I sometimes "understand" quantum stuff, it's been a long long long time since I could discuss it meaningfully. And this article needs more than some guy saying "this concept is ludicrous and I abandoned it twelve minutes after I made it up in 1982". humanbe in 23:50, 30 August 2007 (CDT)
I'd be curious to be know where the concept of "quantum phenomena implies a mind is in control" comes from (I'm a novice at best when it comes to neuroscience). Is that something unique to specific quantum phenomena that they say are applicable to neuroscience? Or are they saying that all quantum phenomena are associated with a "mind"? If I make a quantum harmonic oscillator, have I also created a "mind"? I've heard people try to explain remote viewing with quantum mechanics, and they tend to ignore what the actual science is and only focus on aspects that they think "support" what they want to believe (non-locality and so forth). Kind of a "science a la carte" policy. Seems like that could be the case here.--BayesHave a cold one! 00:58, 31 August 2007 (CDT)
The "paper" where he talks about it is here if you want to take a look. From what I can tell they really are trying to make the claim that a "mind" is needed to collapse a wave function and since some chemical interactions in neurons might have quantum effects a "mind" is needed to control those effects. So yea, as far as I can tell things like the double split experiment are creating a "mind". tmtoulouse irritate 01:03, 31 August 2007 (CDT)
As far as math, I can't buy it till we break that $150 mark or else pay pal is going to get hit me with fees we don't need. Once I get another $10 or so in the account I will pay back colin and "buy" math. tmtoulouse irritate 01:05, 31 August 2007 (CDT)

[edit] tmtoulouse

This user has been vandalising this article and deserves to be blocked. I have reverted his edits before, only to be reverted and threatened with a block. He has never contributed anything of value to it. He should really be blocked. Preferably for a long time. Bohdan17 23:54, 30 August 2007 (CDT)

Please provide sufficient difflinks to support your case. While this user is known to us as a mostly incompetent (and thus harmless) edit-warrer, we need a stronger case to tie his hands more effectively. Bohdan71 23:59, 30 August 2007 (CDT)
No, the article is evidence itself. Tmtoulouse is a vandal. Block him now! Bohdan37
I would also like to bring to your attention User:Human. He vandalised the article earlier. He should be removed as an admin and blocked for a very long time. Bohdan61
Yes, we have that nefarious character in our sights, too. Trouble is, he keeps slithering out of our grasp just when we think we finally have him nailed to rights. Bohdan29
Some pervert named "Etoraced" has also been trying to pwn this article. I suggest we pwn him, chop him up, and eat him with goat fritters, then blockerate him. Bohdan31


Hmm...multiple personalities, nefarious plotting, fishy smell...I wonder who could have written this section?--BayesHave a cold one! 22:37, 31 August 2007 (CDT)<--always suspected Bohdan's Human's pwnage had a Tolkien twist to it
On the contrary, look at the history. It was Human who posted all those in my name! Bohdan 22:39, 31 August 2007 (CDT)
Ohhhhh...so Human has been the mastermind all along. Makes sense, given his deceitful username intended to mask his work.--BayesHave a cold one! 22:48, 31 August 2007 (CDT)

[edit] Completely unimportant

We all know google ranks prove nothing, but our google rank proves we (meaning the writers of this article) are awesome. We're fourth/seventh (depending on how you look at it) and all the sites ahead of us are toxic landfills for O'Leary. ThunderkatzHo! 08:01, 31 August 2007 (CDT)

Top, one might say, because the top page is against us. -- מְתֻרְגְּמָן וִיקִי שְׁלֹום!
Do you think that boost might be because we link to them? ThunderkatzHo! 09:46, 31 August 2007 (CDT)
That was unclear. Do you think it's high because it's rank was boosted by us linking to it? ThunderkatzHo! 09:47, 31 August 2007 (CDT)
I don't know, but shurely it will bring in traffic anyway. Google rankings can just be people laughing at O'Leary (who will probably like RW) - a popular site because of the widespread ridicule does exist.-- מְתֻרְגְּמָן וִיקִי שְׁלֹום!
I don't think its from our link because all EL links on mediawiki are nofollow tagged. Our high google rank is what made O'Leary decide to write about us to begin with I am sure. Maybe we could spark a bit of a debate in the blogosphere is some sympathetic to us decide to write about the situation. tmtoulouse irritate 13:02, 31 August 2007 (CDT)

[edit] Skeptics' Circle!!

Another successful day of Goatery for TMT! He's in the 69th Sketpics' Circle for this here article.--PalMD-Berate Me 07:54, 13 September 2007 (MDT)

[edit] I like it.

An excelent piece of work, the hard work of you rationalpedians has produced wonders :) REELrun 18:05, 3 October 2007 (EDT)

THanks, we like it too!--PalMD-Oy, mein tukhas! 18:17, 3 October 2007 (EDT)

[edit] cover story

user:Thunderkatz added the nomination template.

This is one of our best articles, and already in "featured content", so I am going to "be bold" and jump straight to approval. humanUser talk:Human 19:15, 28 January 2008 (EST)

[edit] Sad.

Errors in reasoning:

[edit] False analogy

Major premise: Matter has the properties of mass, length, temperature and location
Minor premise: Ideas do not have the properties of mass, length, temperature and location
Conclusion: Ideas cannot be created from matter [1]

Quod erat demonstrandum, right?

Major premise: The transistors inside a computer have the properties of location, charge, voltage and temperature.
Minor premise: The letters on this wiki page do not have the properties of location, charge, voltage and temperature.
Conclusion: The letters on this wiki page cannot be created from transistors inside a computer.

This is a cheap false analogy. Letters on a page (minor premise in 2) are not ideas. Ideas are information encoded in the form of those letters by the person who put them in that particular order to reflect that particular idea. You'd do better to say:

1) The transistors inside a computer have the properties of location, charge, voltage and temperature.
2) The ideas stored and transmitted by the transistors in this computer do not have the properties of location, charge, voltage and temperature.
3) Therefore the ideas on this wiki page cannot be created from transistors inside a computer.

But of course, that holds true. Transistors don't think. So once the false analogy is exposed, the argument means nothing. Except maybe to a transistor.

To interrupt your flow, since you made headers. I edited "letters" to say "ideas", thank you for your help! humanUser talk:Human 02:09, 13 February 2008 (EST)
but now the analogy cuts against the author's argument! Transistors can't originate ideas -- they only store and transit ideas that originate outside them! That's the argument made about the brain! -- (guy who started this thread)
Egnor's argument really is one of shard properties, he really thinks that if ideas were caused by material properties then the ideas should have mass and weight. Which is just stupid. What you are arguing is a little different and is argued against a little differently. 67.193.48.17 19:14, 13 February 2008 (EST)

Egnor's argument is silly, but so's the refutation IMO -- the refutation should go to the merits of the argument, not the silly analogy. Ideas are subjective experiences, not objective objects. Being stabbed with an objective knife causes subjective pain transmitted through objective nerves. So it is with ideas. He endows subjective experience with objective reality. That's his mistake. - gwstt.

[edit] Circular reasoning

If Egnor wants to be taken seriously he must come up with a way to identify, measure and test the ghost in his machine.

This assumes what it seeks to prove. The author assumes that in order "to be taken seriously," one must use the scientific method. But what of all the things in this world that cannot be tested through science? Like the scientific method itself, which is a philosophy, not falsifiable science to be observed and tested. It's folly to place so much faith in a process that you exclude the potential validity ON THE MERITS of anything that we don't have the capacity to test according to that method. It assumes what it seeks to prove.

"what of all the things in this world that cannot be tested through science?" I challenge you: name three. humanUser talk:Human 02:10, 13 February 2008 (EST)
Love, Beauty, and Human Stupidity? (Two can't be measured because they're intangible, one because it's infinite.) :D --Gulik 03:32, 13 February 2008 (EST)
I don't consider those "answers" to my question, so much as more challenges to the lovely bunchofnumbers that thinks they pwned this article. humanUser talk:Human 04:14, 13 February 2008 (EST)
I think they're pretty good answers actually -- are they not in the world or are they testable? I'll add some more -- the accuracy of my memories and theories about the origin of life -- (guy who started this subsection)
Actually, you're only asserting they can't be. People have done work on what people find beautiful, for instance. I see no reason why it isn't possible for science to explore, and possibly even understand, what is behind "love". (one kind of love, bonding with babies, has a number of components that I think are understood). And human stupidity (haha) can be catlogued, just not prevented. Yet. humanUser talk:Human 20:07, 13 February 2008 (EST)

How would you empirically test whether an object is beautiful or not? Or the quality of a person's judgment? Or how life came to exist? - gwstt

You're kind of putting it backwards. First, we would have to understand what causes the reaction in humans that makes us say something is beautiful. Since "taste" varies so much, there would be sure to be many variables. If, however, some core was identified, we could then test our idea by formulating a way to make a beautiful object (or music, or face, whatever) and using the formula to make an object, which would then be "tested" by seeing if people thought it was beautiful. And, of course, people have been trying to do this for millennia. And many have succeeded to an extent. To then do the empirical test for beauty, one would analyze an object for the traits in the formula. By the way, symmetry is a common one in human faces, from what I recall. I have no idea why you appended that part about how life started. Oh, I see, it's another "thing that can't be tested". Well, it couldn't be proven that it is "how things really happened", but, um, people are also working on this - essentially recreating old Earth conditions to see if they can get simple/complex molecules of the sort we see in life to form. And, ideally, to crudely self-replicate...
By the way, since when are love and beauty "things"? humanUser talk:Human 21:23, 13 February 2008 (EST)

Interesting ... But even if they found a way it could have happened, it wouldn't be a test to show it DID occur that way ... Also, without a way to find the "core" of beauty, how can we say something is beautiful, as we do every day? Finally, I think that love and beauty are subjective experiences, not material things. But our life is so full of those experiences that our thought needs to leave room for them. Ungtss 21:54, 13 February 2008 (EST)

Well, here's my two cents, I think that we probably can understand love and beauty through science in a personal sense. So for a paricular person we define beauty by what the person finds beautiful, humour by what they find funny etc... and we can study the responses of this person to stimuli in detail and discover exactly what they find beautiful, funny, etc... We do this on a practical level already. We can judge our own taste in aesthetics quite well and we can learn to judge another's taste satisfactorily. As to why a particular thing may be beautiful to a particular person, the result I guess, is due to evolution, cultural and social factors. The people we find beautiful are obviously determined by our genetics but the other two factors are important in aesthetics in general. People from the boroque era would not enjoy modern music that we enjoy for example. It is possible however that cultural and social effects are limited, so you can't make people like any old random art even if they are brought up with it. I freely admit that these are based on speculation and anecdotal evidence but in theory they are testable with the scientific method. However, what about the most important example given, the scientific method itself, or more generally, any ideology? There are thousands of religious, philosophical, political and cultural ideologies that I hope you will agree, are important things in the world and that they cannot be tested with the scientific method. Should we disregard all books written about politics or morality? Should we abandon our ideals?

[edit] Hypocrisy

Beauregard's arguments owe a lot to intelligent design and creationism, since he has basically co-opted their successful two tier strategy. First, create a false dichotomy and then second, find something interesting and proclaim that you don't see how that could happen without a God/soul/alien interfering so therefore a God/soul/alien must have done it.

The materialist alternative is of course to find something interesting and proclaim that it functions solely through materialistic means, even though we don't know what they are; but surely they'll be materialistic, because that's all that exists anyway.

It's too late for me to tear through anymore of this tripe. Mind you, I'm no dualist. I just know nonsense when I see it. 216.186.171.3 01:53, 13 February 2008 (EST)

Please, return when you have more time and address these issues as you see fit. If you want to write a brilliant article (or essay) refuting materialism, and all it entails, I welcome your efforts --- and contributions. humanUser talk:Human 02:13, 13 February 2008 (EST)
Uh we know a lot about how the physical properties in the brain effect thought and ideas, this article includes many examples. 67.193.48.17 19:09, 13 February 2008 (EST)
IMO both materialism and dualism are unfalsifiable -- ergo no point trying to prove either false. For now. But at least we can think logically about these things! -- (guy who started this thread)
Eh, maybe in the most absolute sense of those philosophies that is true. But methodological naturalism and pragmatism in general means that non-materialism is pretty worthless. All advancements in neuroscience have come about by assuming material causes. No prediction or worthwhile research program has ever arrisen out of the assumption of non-materialism. tmtoulouse irritate 19:18, 13 February 2008 (EST)

What's your definition of worth so as to make it worthless? What if, despite its worthlessness, it's actually true? Sure seems harmless to me. - gwstt

[edit] A couple more.

[edit] Straw man

The thought, behavior, emotions, and consciousness all appear to be reliably predicted by the activation of particular brain regions. This is very powerful evidence for materialist based explanations of the "mind" and defiantly not a prediction of any dualist model

Dualism can allow for the activation of particular regions of the brain for certain mental states. The brain can be envisioned as transmitting those pieces of information and/or stimuli, which originate in the great nebulous "mind." Think of a network router transferring data from computers connected to it. The transfer of data through the router does not prove that there are no humans out there, not physically connected to the router, originating the data ... — Unsigned, by: Ungtss / talk / contribs

I did not have to "think" of my router, I "looked" at it. It's a fairly materialist hunk of hardware and software. I'm still looking, however, for evidence of the ghost in the machine. humanUser talk:Human 00:31, 15 February 2008 (EST)
I may not have been clear. Information that originates in your mind is transmitted and stored through electronic circuits. A dualist could argue that same about the mind. The mind originates ideas and will, which are transmitted and stored in the brain. Again, I don't hold this opinion myself. But I don't think "science" has defeated it. It remains a question of interpretation and philosophy. As they say, the most viscious debates are those for which there is no good evidence either way. So it is with philosophy of mind. Ungtss 12:40, 15 February 2008 (EST)

[edit] Begging the question

As models grow in sophistication and other areas of research converge we will slowly approach the ability to accurately model inside computers all of those electrical patterns that were thought to be uniquely "human" and be the source of the "mind" or "soul".

The author assumes this is possible, and uses this assumption as his basis to argue that such research is a "death knell to dualism." Predictions of future discoveries do not falsify alternative theories -- only the discoveries themselves! — Unsigned, by: Ungtss / talk / contribs

Bu the "gaps" do keep getting smaller, don't they? As in, where does the humunculous "exist", and, most importantly - how does it make neurons do stuff in our physical universe? (hint: Jesus Is Magic - Sarah Silverman - ok, that part is pure snark and not an "argument" or "position", but it kind of gets at what I am saying.) And Ungstt, please sign your posts with four tildes, k? humanUser talk:Human 00:34, 15 February 2008 (EST)
Personally, I don't think the gaps are getting smaller. I think the gaps are getting bigger. The more I learn about the brain, the more irreducibly complex and inimitable and "more than the sum of its parts" it begins to look. Don't get me wrong. I'm not a dualist. But I don't think the materialists will have won in any meaningful scientific sense until they can comprehensively explain and duplicate the brain. Until then, I think there's room for both POVs in this world. Unfortunately, both POVs are all too anxious to prematurely proclaim victory through poor reasoning like that demonstrated above ... the author assumes the brain will be comprehensively explained in solely materialistic terms, and then uses that assumption to proclaim victory. Yikes. Ungtss 12:37, 15 February 2008 (EST)
I tend to agree in a conditional sort of way. While we may someday devise a computer and software sophisticated and complicated enough to accomplish the equivalent of thought, it will take some doing. The sum is clearly greater than the parts. The way the brain balances the interraction between sense impressions and memory is an incredibly complex (and fleeting) web of connections, neurotransmitters, receptor sites, etc. It boggles "my" mind. I believe everything that happens in the brain is the result of physical interactions, I don't think there's a "soul" in there, but I suspect there are emergent properties of a system that complex. PoorEd 12:54, 15 February 2008 (EST)
Personally, I totally agree with you. I just think it's still a matter of interpretation of evidence and philosophy, rather than science. Maybe someday we'll have a scientific answer. 'Til then I hope we can all get along with all our different, unfalsifiable opinions:). Ungtss 13:13, 15 February 2008 (EST)
I think that the hardest part of making an artificial "brain" won't be making a complex thing "like it" - it will be adding in the sensory input and motor abilities that build the impressions on the "newborn" brain. You know, like making a "baby" machine of some sort to hold that artificial brain. humanUser talk:Human 14:08, 15 February 2008 (EST)
Yeah, like that movie where the robot keeps looking for more "input, input". It is science that is making progress in understanding the brain, slow and piecemeal as that progress is. We are perhaps in our understanding of the brain where they were with an understanding of how bacteria caused illness back when the microscope was first discovered. PoorEd 14:15, 15 February 2008 (EST)
I'd agree with that assessment. humanUser talk:Human 14:42, 15 February 2008 (EST)

[edit] double slit experiment claim

Excellent piece, but one statement worried me:

"It is not the researchers' “mind” that causes the light to act as a wave or a particle but rather the mechanical nature of the slits in which the light travels through."

My understanding of the classic double-slit experiment was that observing the slits makes the interference pattern disappear (i.e. it makes the electrons stop behaving as waves and start behaving "normally" as particles). That behavioral change (or "observer effect") might be caused by the mechanical nature of the observation technology introduced into the experiment, but the statement above makes it sound like the effect is caused by some kind of change in the slits themselves, which seems very unlikely.

mufi 11:21, 17 May 2008

I don't think that's the case. As I dimly recall, other tests get results that show electrons acting as particles, however, the double slit one produces an interference pattern - something that could only happen if they were acting as waves. The observer's mind has nothing to do with the results except for any part it played in setting up the experiment (choice of tests). humanUser talk:Human 14:30, 17 May 2008 (EDT)

I tend to agree that "The observer's mind has nothing to do with the results except for any part it played in setting up the experiment (choice of tests)." In fact, that is why I offered an alternative explanation, one that I find much more plausible than either observers' minds or "the mechanical nature of the slits" as causal factors in the wave collapse, when I referred to "the mechanical nature of the observation technology introduced into the experiment."

But, whatever the cause, the fact is that the interference pattern is only lost when someone observes the slits (initially, to confirm that electrons have indeed passed through such and such a slit). No one really knows for certain (thus, Heisenberg's uncertainty principle) what is going on at that scale, but my point here is that "the mechanical nature of the slits" seems as much of a non-starter as the observers' minds in explaining the wave collapse.


I say that while it's true, the mind is having a very direct effect on the light, it's not controlling it, just reacting to it, flipping it's finger to push up the switch and starting the machine.

MykalOfDefiance 07:50, 5 November 2009 (UTC)

It's a minor nit, but one that could help to strengthen an otherwise excellent treatment of the subject. [Not that you should take my word for it. I'm a web developer, not a quantum physicist.]

mufi

I agree with you. But you should sign your posts with four tildes, like this: ~~~~ Jellyfish!Chaos! 15:24, 17 May 2008 (EDT)
No, by the time you are "observing" the slits, the physical geometry of the experiment has changed - a device is in place at the slit(s) to track electrons based on their particle properties. Which forces their wave function to collapse and kills the pattern. It's got nothing to do with "a person" doing any observing. humanUser talk:Human 19:14, 17 May 2008 (EDT)
IANAPhysicist, but as I recall from doing this in physics lab, it is not the physical setup that causes the collapse of the wave function, but the observation...User:PalMD
That's what I was informed. Can we get someone expertical in to settle this? Jellyfish!Chaos! 19:26, 17 May 2008 (EDT)
I'm gonna try to look it up somehow. I think one confusion here does come from the conflation (similar to the "evolution is just a theory" argument) of what consititutes "measurement", or , more importantly, "observation" in science. The "act" of observing is not about a mind being present, it's in the mechanics of the lab set up. But as I said, let me see if I can dig up some clarity from old notes and new innertubes. humanUser talk:Human 15:30, 18 May 2008 (EDT)

After reading this article it strikes me that you are not so familiar with the proper definitions of what you are talking about. There used to be a distinction between materialism and dualism that refered to substance dualism; that there are two different substances, mind and matter. However, that distinction has been all but abandoned when considering the so-called mind body problem. The modern discussion is about property dualism; there are different sets of properties that adhere to one substance, matter. Within that discussion come the physicalists or reductionists, and the property dualists. Both sides of the debate have individuals who have different formulations of their respective camp. For instance, some property dualists favour anomolous monism as depicted by Betrand Russell and some favour the supervenience theory. Some property monists favour reducing 'mental' properties to 'physical' properties via a computational analogy and some favour the linguistic analogy.

The point of all this is that non-materialist neuroscience is not necessairily pseudo-science. Science cannot justify itself anymore than arithmatic can justify itself. Any such self-justificaation would be circular and hence no justification at all. Since such a justification of science comes from philosophy one should not denigrate philosophy as much as this site seems to do. Remember that it was philosophers that identified what rationality is and they did not state that science is the end all be all of what is considered rational.

If the article to which I am commenting on is limited to only exposing the incorrect thinking of a small number of people then at least do the charitable thing and state that you are not targeting everyone who holds a more cogent theory of non-materialist neuroscience. Of course, adhering to the principle of charity is the rational thing to do. — Unsigned, by: Sethdeth / talk / contribs

[edit] An Oxymoron?

Isn't science inherently uses Methodological materialistic such that Non-materialistic ones are defying the restrictions? That leads to the Non-materialistic "Science" not using any methods to study, and so not doing anything at all. Thieh 23:35, 28 April 2009 (UTC)

I think that's pretty much what the article is about, yes. It's the biology equivalent of creation science. ħumanUser talk:Human 23:37, 28 April 2009 (UTC)
I guess I have to make things more clear: creation science doesn't have such linguistic problem, as science can be used to create something (Only when you go deep enough as who creates what, which then becomes a problem). Never I have heard wording of a subject of knowledge in an oxymoron. Maybe it should also be in the War on Words sections, if RW happen to has it. Thieh 23:46, 28 April 2009 (UTC)
Yes, true. The thing is, there are idiots arguing for "Non-materialist neuroscience". They think it's a way to keep dualism alive perhaps. ħumanUser talk:Human 00:02, 29 April 2009 (UTC)

[edit] Hagan, Hameroff, Tuszynski reference

This article contains the following:

The first is that quantum effects dominate not just in small spaces but in really small time scales and the time scales that operate in the brain remove any basis for quantum mechanics to have any significant effects. [22]

The link to [22] takes me to:

21. S Hagan, SR Hameroff, and JA Tuszynski, “Quantum computation in brain microtubules: Decoherence and biological feasibility,” Physical Review E 65, no. 6 (2002): 61901.

(I just added a link to the actual paper in a previous edit)

First of all, there seems to be something wrong with the alignment of reference numbers, as I believe the intention is for [22] to take me to footnote #22, not to #21. This alignment error is especially egregious here because the cited paper by Hagan et al actually reaches the opposite conclusion regarding time scales. Here are some key excerpts from the paper:

"The Penrose-Hameroff orchestrated objective reduction (orch. OR) model assigns a cognitive role to quantum computations in microtubules within the neurons of the brain...The model has been criticized as regards the issue of environmental decoherence, and a recent report by Tegmark finds that microtubules can maintain quantum coherence for only 10 − 13 s, far too short to be neurophysiologically relevant." (Abstract, page 1)
"When appropriately revised, both theoretically and numerically, decoherence times due to the tidal influence of Coulomb forces appear to be in line with the relevant dynamical times, in the range 10 − 5 − 10 − 4 s, in accord with biological phenomena. These revisions place the microtubule decoherence time in a range invalidating Tegmark’s assumption that the decoherence time scale is much shorter than relevant physiological dynamical time scales, and suggest that the approximation scheme used is inappropriate to the superposition under consideration." (Outlook, page 10)
"Thus the issue of organized quantum processes in the brain remains open, and subject to experimental verification, an indication that there is cause for optimism that some of the enigmatic features of the cognitive processes occurring in consciousness might yet be understood in a quantum theoretical framework." (Outlook, page 10, last sentence of paper)

In light of this, this section needs revision. One of the following seems to be in order:

  1. Remove any statements regarding incompatibility of time scales.
  2. Retain statements, but acknowledge qualified different viewpoints, referencing the Hagan et al paper.
  3. Retain statements, mention different viewpoints, again referencing the Hagan et al paper, but label all such attempts as failed by referencing other papers that specifically debunk them.

On the whole, the footnote alignment problem is a very serious one for this article, and needs to be fixed to make the article more useful.

Dshin 04:17, 19 June 2009 (UTC)

I think the footnote alignment issue is a MW bug - it used to be endemic, but I thought it was solved a while back. No comment on the actual content of your critique, hopefully Trent will turn up and fix it or discuss it. ħumanUser talk:Human 08:12, 19 June 2009 (UTC)

[edit] BON's critique of Egnor "rebuttal"

There is a fallacy in this example. the ideas on this wiki page were not created from the transistors inside a computer. The transistors inside the computer merely displayed the ideas that was created by some other source. It could then be argued that the brain works like a computer and facillitates the ideas that are generated by some other source.

While that is generally true of text displayed that was written by a person (yeah, like on "this wiki page"), a computer screen can display things that were created by its transistors alone. That said, perhaps a better counterexample might be forthcoming? ħumanUser talk:Human 21:59, 13 September 2009 (UTC)

Here's what I think. A computer screen can remember information, display it, and communicate. Neuroscience says, why can't the brain just be a machine like that? It probably is just a machine. I agree completely with that. I'm saying, why am I conscious and the computer's not, if we're the same thing, varying only in complexity? :D

MykalOfDefiance 07:19, 5 November 2009 (UTC)

But with the argument up there, I'm not trying to debate, just sharing my ideas, the computer does have memory. The internet really doesn't add any functions, just acts on the ones already in the computer.

MykalOfDefiance 07:36, 5 November 2009 (UTC)

[edit] Just asking questions to learn.

Alright, it says that neuroscience is the death-knell of dualism. Neuroscience is the reason I like dualism. Neuroscience shows that every reaction we make is triggered by neural interactions, which act on the spinal cord to act on the muscles and make us react. We're seriously a godly complex, robotic machine. My reply to that is, then why do I get an audience to that? If nothing in me is alive, where does my life come from? If we, godly complex machines, have this large amount of consciousness, why don't simplistic machines, like robots, and ecosystems have minds? I don't think robots and ecosystems have minds. I think that neuroscience does nothing in explaining where my consciousness comes from.

MykalOfDefiance 07:01, 5 November 2009 (UTC)

The flaw in your argument is that consciousness and determinism are not mutually exclusive. As Schopenhauer put it, "You can do what you will, but in any given moment of your life you can will only one definite thing and absolutely nothing other than that one thing." Human beings are thinking, conscious creatures, but that does not mean that neuroscience is wrong. Instead, neuroscience will eventually show us how the human brain creates the human mind through examining how the brain functions. Τe†rоиіαn moar more lame humor 16:26, 5 November 2009 (UTC)
Wait, let me re-explain myself. I know consciousness and determinism aren't mutually exclusive. That's actually what I'm arguing. I'm saying that neuroscience and determinism don't explain consciousness, and that dualism and neuroscience can, and should, until dualism is disproven, coexist. I don't think neuroscience is wrong, I agree with it. I'm a determinist myself. I just want to know that if a really complex machine is conscious, why aren't less complex machines like computers. Neuroscience says we're only really complex machines, and it's backed by a bunch of facts and scientific observations. I just don't think neuroscience explains consciousness, and therefore is not an answer to the mind-body problem. MykalOfDefiance 20:43, 5 November 2009 (UTC)
Consciousness is an emergent phenomenon of a sufficiently complex brain or brain-like organ. Note how many larger-brained animals seem to display the same traits, but to a lesser extent, and as neural complexity decreases, we see less and less of them. Simply being "aware" is probably not as special as we think it is ;) ħumanUser talk:Human 21:04, 5 November 2009 (UTC)
So then why don't computers exhibit a very small amount of awareness, directly proportional to their complexity compared to the complexity of the human brain? Not arguing, just wondering. MykalOfDefiance 21:06, 5 November 2009 (UTC)
I think there are a few reasons - one is that they aren't actually that complex. Another is that they are purpose-built, like a car engine, to do just one thing, which leaves very little room for learning and self-awareness. Also, how do we know they aren't aware? They might be, at some micro-electronic level, but are unable to "express" it due to the rigid control of their I/O systems. Also also, let's say they are "aware" in some way, even if not very much - they are so different from us we might not even recognize the signs of it. ħumanUser talk:Human 21:14, 5 November 2009 (UTC)
I get it. There is no clear line drawn to separate the aware from the unaware. It's a gradual thing. And nature reflects that. That makes sense, coming from bacteria to instinct-driven bugs to humans. It's a progression. Okay. Thanks a lot for the help! MykalOfDefiance 21:22, 5 November 2009 (UTC)
I suppose another thing to ponder is how do you know that a computer isn't aware. Perhaps some are but have no means to express it in a way that we'd understand. Or perhaps, by the standards of a hypthetical alien race, we aren't aware - thus would be liable for extermination to build a hyperspace express way much in the same way that we have no qualms about destroying hornet's nests for construction work. ArmondikoV...I'll castrate your carriage! 21:55, 5 November 2009 (UTC)
Sounds a lot like The Hitch Hiker's Guide to the Universe. MykalOfDefiance 18:29, 6 November 2009 (UTC)
Exactly. There might also be another reason computers are not conscious: have you ever heard of the Chinese Room thought-experiment? Τe†rоиіαn spine-chilling Jesus 18:36, 6 November 2009 (UTC)
While a good enough point, it ignores the big issue of whether the human mind is the same as the person in the room, comprehension may well be an illusion and may also be a sliding scale. Which is possibly what "Dennett's reply from natural selection" is getting at further down the article. ArmondikoV...I'll castrate your carriage! 18:43, 6 November 2009 (UTC)
Dennett's reply is interesting, but I'm not sure if it is logically sound. He is saying that p-zombies would eventually outstrip real humans by natural selection, but I'm not sure why if they are identical except for not having a true "mind." Regardless, I don't see what's wrong with Searle's presupposition that "brains cause minds." (But then, I disagree with Mykal in that I think neuroscience can explain consciousness.) Τe†rоиіαn hey! that's my magnet! 18:57, 6 November 2009 (UTC)
Searle's argument could also be applied to claim that humans aren't "conscious" and have no "understanding" of what they do. We just follow incredibly complex programs, and process our inputs into outputs. I'd ask the computer "are you aware?" and if it said "yes", take its word for it. ħumanUser talk:Human 19:18, 6 November 2009 (UTC)

(undent)Obviously, because that's all you can really do to prove another human is conscious and self aware. Although an interesting idea, there's a lot wrong with the Chinese Room thought-experiment that I've been thinking about since I read it. Perhaps an article on it may be worth while, particularly as I can think of some good rationalist arguments to go with it and WP's is long, convoluted and not particularly easy to follow. ArmondikoV...I'll castrate your carriage! 21:26, 6 November 2009 (UTC)

Indeed. Let us articlify the Chinese room? ħumanUser talk:Human 03:34, 7 November 2009 (UTC)
I started it, but it needs lots of work. Τe†rоиіαn go to hELL! 04:28, 7 November 2009 (UTC)

[edit] materialism, computationalism and scientific neurology

There seem to be two or three unstated assumptions in the article (and too few references to philosophically astute neurologists who publish neuro research) which is troubling: one is the belief that current neurology either is the result of a "materialist" research program or paradigm or that it is somehow a vindication of philosophical materialism. That there is no need for a "soul substance" in neuroscience is in no way a vindication of materialist metaphysics simply because a scientific "refutation" of dualism does not do the work the authors seem to suppose. If metaphysics is about our most general assumptions and presuppositions with regard to knowledge, values and ethics then it is simply false to think that science without the "soul" and "spirit" and "gods" - whether neuroscience or cosmology - is a vindication of a form of monism called "materialism". It might be sobering to read the work on "scientific materialism" in old Soviet or Soviet-sphere articles as a refresher in this regard. If you take the case of philosophers such as John Searle, you will find a non-dualist who is not a proponent of your claims for computational modelling. The eventual triumph of connectionism, computationalism or some other approach in dominating some area of neuroscience will not likely shed much light on your preferred metaphysics of materialism. If this is not obvious to you, then consider that an ontology consistent with values being real is perfectly consistent with your preferred neuro-scientific leanings (I lean to connectionism) but is not consistent with the monism of materialism. For years it was common to hear assertions made about the General Theory of Relativity which are known not to be consistent with mathematical results - in spite of the excellent confirmations of the theory and those expected from the Gravity-Probe B data. And that includes views expressed by none other than a prominent GTR theorist gone over to neuroscience. It is only recently that neuroscience and neuro-psychology have been openly discussing consciousness, beliefs and emotions and it is far too early to think that neuro-imaging alone will win the day for materialism as an ontology for neuroscience. One non-dualist philosopher with views very close to those of, say, António Damásio, is none other than Heiddeger writing on "Stimmung" - and although not a dualist, Heidegger was no materialist. Some ardent neuro-materialists share the view of metaphysical committments of R.G. Collingwood - views that are not likely to entertain seriously that the vindication of materialism is to come from neuroscience. This century will be the century of biology - and perhaps the century of dark-matter physics. This will not ensure that it will be a century in which materialism triumphs as the metaphysics of science if only because science has thus far required mathematics - and that is a trouble spot for materialist metaphysics. The computationalism of the past few decades has also not been free of philosophical bias - and it may require a change of generations at MIT and Stanford before a shift occurs which reflects the changing currents in mathematical thought. Removing "soul substance" from your thinking will not take you very far and has played a curious role in neuroscience: the aversion to "mind" and its connotations has hampered science by impairing research concerning the very nature of human experience and the critical stages of the evolution of a species capable of entertaining and sustaining science let alone explaining the grave dangers facing science in cultures and societies hostile to scientific inquiry and philosophy. Among philosphers, Susanne Langer saw some of these issues years ago and is a philosopher worth reading in this regard. Various authors have examined the impact of "materialist" behaviorism in retarding scientific research and theory. Medical "materialism" is likely the culprit in delaying a good deal of research including simple reflex learning tests to detect consciousness in "non-responsive" patients. Materialist assumptions may not always have served science as well as you imagine: not in economics and not in psychology. The jury is out on computationalism.

[edit] Philosophical journals

Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences isn't a philosophy journal. It's a scientific journal. It's for more speculative or exploratory pieces by scientists working in biology. There are philosophical arguments for dualism, but they would be published somewhere like Philosophy or Nous, not a Royal Society journal. And those advancing philosophical arguments for dualism (I'm guessing they must exist - most philosophers these days seem to be in the materialist or the reluctant property dualist camp) generally aren't claiming that neuroscience is backing those arguments up. At least, that's what I can gather from the limited knowledge I have of the literature in philosophy of mind - it's not an area I keep up with. As for non-materialist neuroscience, I think it's a bit of a stretch to say it's as nakedly political as ID. Yes, Discovery Institute are involved, and it's worth noting that - but I haven't seen non-materialist neuroscience advocated for the high-school classroom - but that may only be because neuroscience/psychology/philosophy of mind (etc.) doesn't really get taught at high schools (ID is strange like that: generally scholarly advances are trickle-down - learn new stuff, then you start teaching postgrads new stuff, then undergrads, then high school etc. With ID, you convince the school kids first, then convince the professors!) --Tom Morris (talk) 11:21, 22 December 2009 (UTC)

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