Talk:Argument from marginal cases

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A few comments

1. Account suspension

I apologize for my obnoxiousness in the past, and I truly wish to distance myself from what I've done. To that extent, I shall write more clearly, concisely, and to the point. I also haven't touched an abortion article or talk page in months--nor do I plan to; I believe my position on the issue may have even reversed. You may also see the reasonableness of comments I will add to this talk page shortly in terms of length and clarity. For these reasons, please do not suspend my account.

2. Quality of the article

Thank you, Weaseloid, for pruning the excesses and making the article clearer. I also apologize for my laziness in failing to provide citations; I just happen to be fairly knowledgeable about animal protectionism and the arguments behind it, so I thought I was just writing "encyclopedically" and would return to straighten up the rough draft, adding citations--though you'e already done most of the work.

3. Crankery

I am hugely hurt that I am perceived as a crank--it is mostly my fault, though, for having been so dogmatic, heavy-handed, and intemperately long-winded in the past. I also apologize for my lack of clarity; but fortunately many of these problems of communication are being steadily resolved. Beyond that, I am quite bright, with an 800 on the reading section of the SAT and a 710 on the mathematics section. This implies that I probably have good insight, at least occasionally, to impart. However, cranks, such as L. Ron Hubbard and Christopher Langan, could be the most brilliant among us, flouncing the requirement of high test scores to qualify as "insightful" rather than cranky. I will try elsewhere to briefly demonstrate that the argument from marginal cases is not as crankish as it may seem, and hopefully I can at least partially restore my "reputation."--Animalian (talk) 16:09, 31 May 2015 (UTC)

Hey, I'm glad to see that you are trying to change your attitude, but like was pointed before to you, you're still being too long-winded. Few people have the patience to read the walls of text you put up, this is counter-productive for you. Super ^{Dude,Where's my car?} 17:35, 31 May 2015 (UTC)

To refute the logic behind the AMC, you would have to

locate a morally relevant difference which supposedly justifies the rape, torture, and murder of billions of animals but not similarly situated human beings,

demonstrate that this difference is, in fact, morally relevant, and

demonstrate that this morally relevant difference, in fact, justifies our treatment of animals but not similarly situated human beings

There we are. Much shorter.--Animalian (talk) 17:47, 31 May 2015 (UTC)

Protip: You probably won't get on anyone's good spirits by bragging about your SAT scores. |₹Λ¥$€₦₦ ^{Work that sucker to death} 19:03, 31 May 2015 (UTC)

Being good at math and reading doesn't necessarily imply you've got great wisdoms to impart. But keep up the good work and positive attitude. ;) 141.134.75.236 (talk) 19:34, 31 May 2015 (UTC)

I was trying to establish some modicum of reputability--after being called a crank, I do not feel particularly respected. However, it is faulty to assume that relatively high reasoning ability necessarily correlates to insightfulness, especially when an enlightened perspective reveals just how limited our knowledge and reasoning abilities are; intelligent people also make prolific if not convincing liars.--Animalian (talk) 20:07, 31 May 2015 (UTC)

Ah, don't be too upset with Weaseloid's phrasing. He tends to be a bit strong-worded sometimes. 141.134.75.236 (talk) 20:13, 31 May 2015 (UTC)

Problematic "problem" section

There are several deficits in the current "problem" section. Namely, it is morally arbitrary to withhold rights from animals, yet extend them to relevantly similar human individuals. I will attempt to explain my reasoning below:

Paragraph 1

Some people are admittedly less able than others. For example, some of us are intellectual titans, such as Bertrand Russell, while many are far more humble. Human intelligence is also self-normative to the bell curve. Some people are simply less intellectually endowed. The label “marginal” may feel uncomfortable, or even disparaging, but it merely designates the class of human beings who for whatever reason are disabled, or whose functioning is less than we would expect of a more “normal” human being. The other labels we apply are challenged, disabled, and mentally retarded. “Marginal human beings” is merely a coverall for such people.

Second, such human beings may not, within the utilitarian calculus, be a proper part of society; they often drain tremendous resources which could alleviate more suffering or promote more happiness elsewhere. For example, your dying grandfather afflicted with could drain upward of $100,000 in life-sustaining treatments for just an additional two months of life, when this money could prevent thousands from going blind or save hundreds of children from starving to death, or benefit other members of the family. If often costs exorbitant amounts of money to sustain many premature children; my niece’s life was sustained at a cost of nearly $1,000,000, which, from the utilitarian standpoint, could have been far better invested elsewhere.

Since our minimal morality demands a respect for life, especially innocent life, as codified in the moral imperative, do not kill innocent beings, we need not argue that disabled or “marginal” human beings are absolutely unfit for life. Instead, we respect them as unique individuals in and of themselves, subject to many of the same protections as “higher-functioning” individuals. In fact, once we accept a minimal morality, such as do not kill or unnecessarily harm innocent beings, even the most marginal among us, such as anencephalic infants, warrant some level of protection. This includes animals as well, who, unlike anencephalic infants, are often sentient, conscious beings, the rights of whom are compounded by virtue of such sentience and consciousness.

Contrary to what this paragraph argues, a minimal morality elevates and protects disabled humans and animals alike.--Animalian (talk) 17:44, 12 June 2015 (UTC)

Possibly, but that depends on everyone viewing rights in the same framing. A long history of the debate suggests that is not the case. ikanreed ^{You probably didn't deserve that} 17:55, 12 June 2015 (UTC)

I implicitly recognized that "debate suggests this is not the case" by not adding anything to the article as it stands. I am merely debating certain assertions in the article behind the scenes.--Animalian (talk) 04:42, 13 June 2015 (UTC)

Furthermore, why should we view rights as belonging to all and only human beings? The arguments against such a restriction are very compelling, such that if we embrace justice as an operator in our moral system, morality seems to transcend the species barrier, as I have argued, and apply to animals as well, conferring rights in the process.--Animalian (talk) 04:45, 13 June 2015 (UTC)

Homo sapiens are humans. The definition doesn't involve or imply an intelligence criterion. The notion that some people are subhuman, marginally human or in any other way less human than other humans has no sound basis and doesn't tend to lead in good directions. Wėąṣėḷőįď^{Methinks it is a Weasel} 23:40, 13 June 2015 (UTC)

Weaseloid, I am not devaluing human beings. Rather, I am valuing the lives of the often most neglected and abused beings on our planet. I argue that the intelligence criterion is largely if not wholly irrelevant when it comes to suffering. I argue instead that all sentient beings, including the most “marginal” among us, the retarded, incapacitated, or otherwise disabled, are endowed with certain inalienable rights, including the right to life, integrity, and respect. Consistent with morality and justice, I apply instead the sentience criterion, which ensures that even the most marginal among us, including animals, are afforded substantial protections. Neither human beings nor non-human animals shall be made to suffer unnecessarily, caused gratuitous harm, or denied the right to a decent life; these rights are inherent to their being. As such, I rile against the utilitarian considerations by which we could purge the weakest and most vulnerable among us, including infants, the retarded, and the elderly, merely on the basis of their condition. I extend protections to animals in the same spirit, that we should be good to all, rather than good to one, whether the human "ideal", or the human species itself. Morality simply transcends such perfectionistic and speciesist barriers, as you have partly acknowledged. Please acknowledge the rights and lives of all, not just we human creatures.--Animalian (talk) 19:02, 16 June 2015 (UTC)

I acknowledge no such thing. Your arguments about morality & inalienable rights rest on pure assertion. Wèàšèìòìď^{Methinks it is a Weasel} 19:37, 16 June 2015 (UTC)

Most arguments about morality rest on assertion, though. And when it comes to assertions, the assertion that morality can only apply to human beings seems like a pretty doubtful one. 141.134.75.236 (talk) 19:41, 16 June 2015 (UTC)

Weaseloid, do you deny that people have rights, or that animals have rights? Or do you deny the whole of ethics?--Animalian (talk) 02:25, 17 June 2015 (UTC)

Paragraph 2

The assumption that rights apply to all and only human beings is unreasonably dogmatic and contrary to the demands of justice. Namely, in the name of consistency, without which we are morally arbitrary and hypocritical, we must treat animals similarly to relevantly similar persons in relevantly similar situations. Since both cats and human infants generally suffer when subjected to flames, assuming both are equally innocent and the outcomes of such exposure roughly the same, we must consider the harms of approximately equal severity, even between species. The fact that the cat belongs to the species Felis catus rather than Homo sapiens is largely irrelevant; both suffer likewise, and the same protections against unnecessary suffering extend to each. Species membership is therefore largely irrelevant as a moral distinction.

Additionally, there is a minimal morality which must be respected in each case. This morality consists of the following foundational principles:

The principle of nonmaleficence: Do not cause harm.

The principle of beneficence: Do good, promote happiness, and alleviate suffering.

From these prima facie principles we derive the “harm” principle:

Do not cause unnecessary suffering.

All of these principles correspond to the purpose of morality, to alleviate suffering and promote happiness. Notice, however, that these principles are in no way constrained only to mankind—they apply to all and only beings which can be harmed or benefited, which include plants, animals, and bacteria alongside human beings. Given that sentient beings such as cows, chickens, and pigs moreover suffer from being harmed, rather than merely being the passive recipient of harm, such as a bacterium or plant, their rights against being harmed are duly strengthened. Since humans are likewise sentient, though generally endowed with higher culture and higher capacity for rationality, human rights extend to include many animals; in fact, it is both redundant and inappropriate to refer to “human” rights when we refer to the more fundamental category of simply rights.

Please be consistent and have respect for animals.--Animalian (talk) 03:14, 12 June 2015 (UTC)

I'm sorry, you've just raised an unrelated moral system as a bare assertion in your defense against this critique. You'd have to demonstrate that nonmaleficence is both necessary and justified in an absolute sense. A commonly contested point. Many moral systems include maleficence in the defense of innocence, often as part of a broader utilitarian view. We could easily have a hundred thousand word debate about this one principle's utility/accuracy/value/meaning as a moral system. Then you throw another on top of it.

What is this unrelated moral system? Is it a moral system which contains universal moral principles, binding on all moral agents, and protective of all beings capable of being harmed or benefited? I believe the contention about this "unrelated moral system" is that it acknowledges universal principles which do not include the restrictive phrase "all and only human beings." I find the addition of such a phrase very conspicuous, altering the principle "one ought not to cause unnecessary harm" to "one ought not to cause unnecessary suffering to all and only human beings." You would have to justify the addition of the restrictive phrase, namely, by finding a morally relevant difference which justifies the restriction of rights or moral consideration to all and only human beings, rather than all beings which can be harmed or benefited, pleasured or made to suffer. I have identified this three part process elsewhere on the talk page in bold. If your contention or meaning in writing of an "unrelated moral system" is otherwise, please inform me, so I can address your challenge(s) with greater relevancy.--Animalian (talk) 04:57, 13 June 2015 (UTC)

That's not to say it's wrong, but it's a very dogmatic assertion for an argument asserting dogma. ikanreed ^{You probably didn't deserve that} 18:01, 12 June 2015 (UTC)

I believe I understand your meaning here. I was intelligent enough to foresee that I was being dogmatic--what ultimate proof for an objective, absolute morality could I possibly provide? You very aptly pointed out a very deep problem, endemic to all morality, which I hap hoped would be glanced over. The reason I entertained this immoral hope--because I want to protect the animals and myself; I assume morality for the sake of protecting all, rather than risk destroying all. I am elsewise quite forthcoming. Assuming morality, especially as guided by the principle of justice, I have argued that it is arbitrary to restrict morality to all and only human beings; again, you would have to refer to the three-part process I have outlined in bold, satisfy each step, and then survive the process--or whatever modicum thereof here on RW--of peer review. Namely, you would have to justify why the stated moral principles, which deal with harm and benefit, would apply to all and only human beings, when it is clearly the case that both humans and non-human animals can be benefited or harmed. Do please continue to argue--I appreciate your intellect.--Animalian (talk) 05:12, 13 June 2015 (UTC)

Paragraph 3

Fortunately, we at least question why rights are limited to all and only human beings in this paragraph. However, there are still inaccuracies in the given explanations.

The religious explanation:

Religion is almost certainly a falsehood, and with it an afterlife and eternal soul. It is, in fact, a remnant of religion that we still believe that human beings are so superior as that animals have no or minimal moral status. The enlightened perspective reveals that we, too, are animals, just another product of nature, who shares many of the same emotional capacities and mental faculties as our fellow animals. It would be marvelously improbable that nature would produce only one sentient or self-conscious species. Instead, many of the human talents are a matter of degree and not kind, as Darwin himself elucidated; many of us our conscious, sentient beings, deserving of moral consideration.

The genetic explanation:

That we have stronger obligations to members of our own species presupposes that we have obligations, albeit of a weaker variety, to members of other species. Otherwise, relative to whom or what would we have stronger obligations? Even if these obligations are stronger, does it imply that animals have no moral considerability at all, that they should be categorically denied rights? It only follows that our recognition of their rights, inferable from our obligations to them (by the imperative, do not harm to others, animals have a prima facie right to not be harmed), is of a secondary importance. And even if their rights of a secondary importance, it still does not follow that we should suspend their rights utterly and treat them with impunity, as we do in factory farms, from whence over 99% of the meat in the US comes, the cold, harsh, inescapable reality, and at slaughterhouses. Above, I have also explained why it is arbitrary to limit to rights to all and only humans. Morality, and its foundational principles, such as do not cause unnecessary suffering, simply transcends the species barrier.

The social contract:

Just because we have agreed to the present social arrangement, wherein we deprive, brutalize, and mutilate billions of animals every year in factory farms and at slaughterhouses, does not mean that this arrangement is inherently just. It is, in fact, inherently unjust. There is simply no morally relevant criterion of such significance as that we may categorically deny other animals moral status and concordant rights. In fact, applying a minimal morality, accepting principles such as it is prima facie wrong to cause harm, do evil, or inflict unnecessary suffering, we quickly realize that morality transcends the species barrier, and applies to all animals or beings capable of being harmed or made to suffer. Any attempt to constrain morality to humans and deny its protections to morally similar animals is purely arbitrary.

Secondly, since sentient, conscious beings such as cows, chickens, and pigs, can properly be said to have rights, it follows that our minimal morality, which consists of principles such as do not cause unnecessary suffering, it follows that the social contract should extend many of the same protections with which we insure human beings to these animals. Any attempt to restrict this minimal morality is purely arbitrary; we are united, as sentient, conscious beings, who can be harmed or benefited, pleasured or tortured. Though animals may lack some of the “higher” rights which we ascribe to human beings, such as the right to vote, they share the same fundamental rights common to all human beings, such as the right to not be harmed unnecessarily or caused unnecessary harm. The rights of animals can moreover be represented and defended by someone willing and able, just as the rights to of the mentally handicapped and physically disabled can be represented and defended. In this sense, animals, though not immediately part of our more strictly “human” society, are members of our moral community, endowed with many of the same rights as we ourselves.

We may argue even further, within the social contract, that we have stronger obligations to animals whom we bring into existence, just as parents have stronger obligations to the children for whose existence they are responsible. It is moreover irresponsible to bring beings into existence which we cannot properly support. We should, for example, refrain from birthing a child into extreme poverty; it generally condemns such a child to an unnecessary life of starvation, toil, and overall misery. Even more irresponsible is it to bring into existence billions of animals who steal the grain from the starving, and how profoundly immoral when we force these animals to live lives of abject misery in factory farms only to profit from their untimely demise. Because we are responsible for their existence, an existence which is completely unnecessary, since we could glut ourselves and even feed the starving on plant proteins, rather than waste such proteins on animals, and moreover cause unnecessary suffering to the extreme, our evil, accepting a minimal morality within a just social contract, is duly compounded. Animals are undeniably part of our moral community, and this kinship should inspire respect and the sanctions of a just moral law.--Animalian (talk) 17:04, 12 June 2015 (UTC)

At ANY rate

I don't actually disagree with the premise of argument from marginal cases. I personally find it pretty valid, but I don't think any of the criticisms raised by Animalian justify removing or altering the subsection's content. ikanreed ^{You probably didn't deserve that} 20:07, 16 June 2015 (UTC)

Which specific criticisms do you find invalid and why?--Animalian (talk) 02:22, 17 June 2015 (UTC)

Validity of criticism isn't the question here, though I raised a couple of serious concerns above. The problem is that they lack some undeniable moral imperative that means the problems with the idea can't be rational in its basis. What the "problems" section actually says are serious concerns that anyone attempting to adopt this philosophy should grapple with. The fact that you've grappled with them and come up with answers yourself doesn't mean others shouldn't also. ikanreed ^{You probably didn't deserve that} 12:29, 17 June 2015 (UTC)

You have raised your criticisms, and I have responded to them earnestly; some still await your redress, as under Paragraph 2. The present contention, however, concerns whether my arguments have a sound, rational basis. In particular, are they guided by some “undeniable moral imperative”? I am compelled to respond in the affirmative. Namely, I have repeatedly made appeal to the principle that we should not cause unnecessary harm, a universal principle if ever there were one. This principle not only satisfies the deontologist, who postulates rights and correlate duties on its basis, such as the right to not be caused unnecessary harm and the duty to refrain from causing unnecessary harm, but also the utilitarian, who seeks to alleviate suffering and promote happiness so as to maximize utility. The virtue ethicist might also appreciate the character such a principle builds, since adherence to such a principle would prohibit wanton cruelty, while contractarians, of either the Hobbesian or Rawlsian sort, as well as many ethical egoists, might further recognize that adherence to such a principle will generally fall within everyone’s long-term rational self-interest and form a major component of a just society. Just as I have argued that morality simply transcends speciesist and perfectionistic barriers, the principle, do not cause unnecessary harm, appears to transcend denominational barriers within ethics, implying the universality sought of some "undeniable moral imperative".--Animalian (talk) 20:57, 18 June 2015 (UTC)

An Analysis of the "Problems" with the Argument

The argument's most basic flaw is defining disabled people, coma victims and — in some iterations — young children as "marginal cases", an opaque label that is rarely (if ever) applied to them otherwise. - What a ridiculous way to start. The actual words chosen to describe these people doesn't matter, humans create words. Is there a better phrase?

The implication that these are not proper human beings or members of society is rather disturbing and the same line of reasoning could be used to argue against respecting and protecting these people's rights. - Exactly. That's the point. It would be disturbing to claim these humans do not deserve rights just by virtue of they do not pass a certain threshold of intelligence, self-awareness etc. so it should be same for non-human animals.

Connected with this is the assumption that human rights are defined by ability, such as the ability to suffer, whereas human rights proponents define the rights instead as belonging to all humans and not to anything other than humans. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example, begins with the statement that "recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world" - Yeah exactly. This argument reveals this meaningless speciesism.

There are legitimate questions about why human rights are so defined, and a variety of explanations ranging from the religious (God endowed humankind with its special status) - Not even worth commenting on.

to the genetic (we have stronger obligations to members of our own species than any other) - not really. We have as much of a "stronger obligation" to our own species that we do a "stronger obligation" to our own sex or race.

to the social contract (we have a commitment to protect members of our society) - Does this mean xenophobia is not only justified but actually correct conduct?.

Animals do not meet any of these criteria (though some animal rights proponents argue, rather dubiously, that pets and farm animals are members of our society). - Perhaps, but these criteria are not as watertight as some might think.

Broadly speaking, all of these ideas designed to rationalize human rights being justified but animal rights not do not protect intelligent life outside humanity, and even more disturbingly, there is no logical reason why rights should be extended specifically at the species level but withheld outside it. ......... In general, attempting to rationalize away the question of animal rights is little more than that: rationalization so that one can kill animals with impunity by ensuring that any entity one does not personally value is exempt from all moral calculus "by definition." - Preach!!!!!

Certainly the concept of human rights has a lot to do with humanity's capacity (as a species) for rationality, abstract thought, and empathy — even if we extend the same rights to members of our species who are lacking in these capacities. - Special pleading FTW!

If we were confronted with a species or entity with capacities for rationality similar to our own — for example, a newly discovered extraterrestrial species or, arguably, a highly advanced artificial intelligence — we would be faced with the dilemma of whether to accord them the same rights as humans. This is a common theme within science fiction. - We most likely should.

None of the current species on Earth have the cognitive abilities to place us in this dilemma, but the argument from marginal cases subverts this by lowering the bar: extending human rights not only to species with the cognitive abilities of a typical human but to species with cognitive abilities comparable to those of a human with severely reduced cognitive abilities. ...... This could be applied not only to animals but to even the simplest of AI computer programs, such as a chatterbot, chess computer or a non-player character in any video game. - The basis of animal rights calls for an equal consideration of interests. Computers and computer programs have no emotions and have no interests, and NPC characters have no thoughts except for what they are programmed to do. This argument may become useful in the far future if we ever create conscious machines and the topic of robot rights becomes relevant, but this is irrelevant to the present situation with animals. RockyRob97 (talk) 09:57, 25 September 2017 (UTC)

RationalWiki's take on Marginal Cases

So, I'll be looking at the problems section and why I remain unconvinced that Marginal Cases is actually problematic. I'd greatly appreciate it if RationalWikians who share the article's sentiments would engage with me.

>The argument's most basic flaw is defining disabled people, coma victims and — in some iterations — young children as "marginal cases", an opaque label that is rarely (if ever) applied to them otherwise. The implication that these are not proper human beings or members of society is rather disturbing and the same line of reasoning could be used to argue against respecting and protecting these people's rights.

They're considered marginal because they're comparable to animals (who are universally defined as marginal or inferior to humans) in terms of sentience and intelligence. Calling that rather disturbing isn't an argument. And sure, Marginal Cases could be used to argue against human rights, if you used it against a misanthrope. However, that doesn't invalidate anything. That just means there are multiple ways of responding to it. The question remains, can you spell out a morally relevant difference between marginal humans and animals? We'll find out.

>Connected with this is the assumption that human rights are defined by ability, such as the ability to suffer, whereas human rights proponents define the rights instead as belonging to all humans and not to anything other than humans. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example, begins with the statement that "recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world"

This is a descriptive response. You're not actually providing a justification as to why human rights are defined that way, which is precisely what the argument is asking for.

>There are legitimate questions about why human rights are so defined, and a variety of explanations ranging from the religious (God endowed humankind with its special status) to the genetic (we have stronger obligations to members of our own species than any other) to the social contract (we have a commitment to protect members of our society). Animals do not meet any of these criteria (though some animal rights proponents argue, rather dubiously, that pets and farm animals are members of our society).

You list a number of explanations, but which one do you actually subscribe to? All of them? I just want to be clear before I respond to any of these. EDIT: Never mind. Because what follows after this part is a literal refutation of the aforementioned explanations. It's confusing that the Problems section is this counterproductive. In addition, it has listed only two problems with the argument, one of them being I'm offended. (I don't mean to be a dick, if you're offended, that's fair. But whether or not something is offensive doesn't make it untrue or fallacious)

Also, can someone teach me how to quote on here? Using quotation marks italicizes the word.

There's another section, called Human Rationality, which does seem to pose a rebuttal. Let's take a look:

>Certainly the concept of human rights has a lot to do with humanity's capacity (as a species) for rationality, abstract thought, and empathy — even if we extend the same rights to members of our species who are lacking in these capacities.

Right, and why is that? Why would a human that's not rational be afforded rights if rationality is the basis for rights?

>If we were confronted with a species or entity with capacities for rationality similar to our own — for example, a newly discovered extraterrestrial species or, arguably, a highly advanced artificial intelligence — we would be faced with the dilemma of whether to accord them the same rights as humans. This is a common theme within science fiction. None of the current species on Earth have the cognitive abilities to place us in this dilemma, but the argument from marginal cases subverts this by lowering the bar: extending human rights not only to species with the cognitive abilities of a typical human but to species with cognitive abilities comparable to those of a human with severely reduced cognitive abilities.

Yes, because there is no morally relevant difference between a marginal human and an animal. And since we still want to afford marginal humans basic rights, we should apply that to animals as well. Unless you can name a morally relevant difference. Which hasn't happened so far.

>Hence, instead of applying the reasonable principle of "if it behaves like a human, treat it like a human", which we could use in the hypothetical case of dealing with a new species, extraterrestrial or AI, the argument from marginal cases applies the principle of "if it behaves like a human with impaired capacities, treat it like a human with impaired capacities". This could be applied not only to animals but to even the simplest of AI computer programs, such as a chatterbotWikipedia's W.svg, chess computer or a non-player character in any video game.

AI computer programs, chatterbots, and video game characters lack sentience; the capacity to experience subjectively and to suffer. They're ergo not equivalent to animals. ^{— Unsigned, by: Zygote / talk / contribs}

What is this article even trying to say?

At first I thought that this would be like articles on similar subjects, a dissection of a reductionist argument that points out its logical flaws and why a reasonable person might not agree with it.

Then I come to the "problems" section, but the way it's written is as if it's been torn from a counterargument to an article arguing against the AMC. The tone suggests that it's refuting what came before it, but by all accounts it appears to continue on with and expand on the reductionism with a slippery slope that in effect seems to make an argument that could easily be used to assert that dogs should be able to vote? I'm not being dumb here, right, it's arguing that because Neanderthals would be very similar to humans and other homo species would be similar to them and so on that all animals of an arbitrarily large clade should have equal rights to humans?

I'm just having difficulty in trying to understand what the point of the article is. Is it to uncritically argue for the dubious assertion that since some people have intellectual disorders PETA is right? Is it to lay out an argument often used by cranks and the merits and flaws to it? Is it to proofread some guy's essay?

Because as it stands it's just confusing. 2601:280:C980:8BA0:7488:19E1:53A0:5A5F (talk) 06:05, 21 March 2022 (UTC)